Small Claims Revisions - A Break for the Layman by Fox, Harry James
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 4 1971 Article 3 
Small Claims Revisions - A Break for the Layman 
Harry James Fox 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Harry J. Fox, Small Claims Revisions - A Break for the Layman , 20 DePaul L. Rev. 912 (1971) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol20/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
SMALL CLAJMS REVISIONS--A BREAK
FOR THE LAYMAN
HARRY JAMES FOX*
HE SMALL Claims Court as it now exists in most states is the
product of a reform movement which began in the early part
of the century. The theory underlying this movement was that
such a court would "obviate the expense and delay due to ordinary
methods of litigation and . . .operate for rich and poor alike."1
Thus, the basic philosophy behind a small claims court is that the
courts must respond to the right of the unrepresented plaintiff to file
and process his own claim. The movement is well documented and
is in a sense memorialized in the state statutes establishing small
claims or debtors courts.8
The small claims court with its streamlined procedure had an ap-
peal which could not long be overlooked by the collection litigant
who could well consider this court nothing more than an extension
of his collection agency.4
The spirit that was meant to assist the individual had failed. The
machine had turned against both rich and poor. One could no
longer process his own claim because in the rush for efficient man-
agement of the growing small claims caseload, no one had time for
* MR. Fox received his B.A. at Knox College, and his J.D. at the University
of Illinois; he is presently a practicing member of the Illinois Bar with the East
Garfield Neighborhood Legal Services.
1. Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, 191 Cal. 133, 136, 215 P. 391, 393-94
(1923).
2. H. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 56 (1919).
3. Leuschen v. Small Claims Court, supra note 1; Small Claims Court-Reform
Revisited, 5 COLUM. J.L. AND SOCIAL PROB. 47; Note, Small Claims Courts, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 932 (1959); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION STUDIES 1
(1959); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISRATION STUDIES, Part. 2, 16, 18 (1955).
4. Note, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L. REV. 237
(1952); Carlin and Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 381, 421 (1965).
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him. 5 If he sought private counsel, he was told that such a claim
was not sufficiently lucrative for the counsel to pursue.8
Realizing that the problem of the unrepresented claimant is in many
respects a problem involving the alienation of a large segment of the
population, one must look to proposals which would resolve this con-
flict between the court and the claimant and which would dispel
any notion that the courts are the exclusive domain of collection
agents and attorneys. It is not within the scope of this paper to speak
generally to the needed reforms of the small claims court, but rather
to look at those proposals which seek to fulfill the needs of the un-
represented and occasional plaintiff. It will be obvious that many of
the proposals are an attempt to eliminate known abuses in the small
claims court and are, thus, relevant to such a court, be it a "collection
agency" or a "forum for the people."
It is the hypothesis of this paper that a separation of cases by class
based upon the distinction between "collection" and unrepresented
plaintiff cases must be made in order to create that atmosphere which
will allow the unrepresented plaintiff his day in court, while pro-
viding those safeguards and orderly procedure essential to the in-
tegrity of the judicial institution. To sustain the separation, limita-
tions must be proposed. To sustain the court, procedures and tech-
niques must be developed. When looking at the small claims court,
many commentators see the abuses that are present and suggest limi-
tations to eliminate or curb the abuses. The theory of the small
claims court can operate for the benefit of both classes of small
claims. If the argument were otherwise it appears questionable that
any restrictions based upon a theory of discouraging access to the
court as a method of hindering or disuading collection cases7 is as il-
5. In the calendar year 1969, 88,559 small claims, exclusive of tax cases, were
begun in the Municipal Department, Circuit Court of Cook County. Letter from
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts to the Judges of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, March 6, 1970. In the first quarter of 1970, 17,236 such cases
were begun in the First District of the Municipal Department, Circuit Court of
Cook County. Letter from Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts to the Judges
of the Circuit Court of Cook County, May 26, 1970. It has been estimated that
less than two percent of the cases filed in the First District were filed by unrepre-
sented plaintiffs. Interview with William Zaret, Court Coordinator, Circuit Court of
Cook County, Oct. 28, 1970.
6. Robinson, A Small Claims Court in Chicago's New Circuit Court, 44 CHI.
B. REC. 421, 421-22 (1963).
7. Note, Small Claims Courts, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1957, 1974 (1969).
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logical as the statement that there is no room for the unrepresented
plaintiff in the small claims courts.
SEPARATION BY SECTION
The separation should take the form of a section of the circuit
court, for example, a section of the Municipal Department of the Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County. The proposal is based upon several
factors. First, Illinois has a unified court system" which should not
be disturbed simply to provide for a separate court for small claims.
Second, legislative provision has been made for special treatment of
the small claim, as the Supreme Court of Illinois has been given power
to make rules governing pleading, practice, and procedure including
service of process governing the small claim.' Third, the Supreme
Court of Illinois has taken the lead from this authorization and has
established rules relating to small claims."0 Fourth, further rules by
the Supreme Court of Illinois could be an effective method of pro-
ducing the separation by class. These rules would at the minimum
be ones which would describe the characteristics and features re-
quired of the plaintiff before filing in the section. This method
has the advantages of being applicable throughout the state and of
having existing machinery for settlement of disputes with a minor
work load increase. In contrast, those proposals which suggest ex-
trajudicial and parajudicial approaches, such as arbritration boards
and conciliation departments,'" are burdened by the need to establish
such dispute centers. Certain of the problems of these alternative
approaches will be noted in a discussion of the New York system,
which has an excellent small claims court where an unrepresented
claimant may file. The California and Detroit Courts will also be
noted as they can best be compared to one which might be established
in Illinois.
LIMITATIONS ON THE PLAINTIFF
The limitations, which can be referred to as "jurisdictional," are to
8. Judicial Article 8. See also Fins, Analysis of Illinois Judicial Article of
1961 and Its Legislative and Judicial Interpretation, 11 DE PAUL L. REV. 185
(1962); Mulliken, The Unified Trial Court, 50 ILL. B.J. 668 (1962).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1967).
10. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 281-88, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 281-88 (1969).
11. Jackson & Taylor, Center for Dispute Settlement-A New Use for an Old
Tool, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 131 (1969).
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separate the small claim from other claims and to distinguish the
classes of small claims. These limitations on plaintiffs include re-
strictions upon the size of the claim, number of claims, type of claim,
type of plaintiff, and the representation of the plaintiff.
The claim we are dealing with is by definition small. The Supreme
Court Rules now provide that a small claim is one which is either in
contract or tort (including tax claims) for an amount of less than one
thousand dollars.12 The separation by class would not appear to
warrant a change in the one thousand dollar limit which is intended
to separate the small claim from other claims.'"
The second limitation is one which would limit the number of
suits a plaintiff could file in the small claims section within a stated
time period. This limitation is intended to discourage any claimant
from undertaking mass filing, which would abuse the section and de-
feat the separation of classes. It is also intended to discourage mass
filing without the assistance of counsel, although an unrepresented
claimant could file as many claims as he wished in the collection
section. Such a claimant would not be permitted to enjoy the "at-
mosphere" of the unrepresented section and, thus, would not "pol-
lute" it. This rule alone could effect the desired separation of
classes.
The small claims court in Detroit provides for such a rule by not
accepting any case for placement on the conciliation docket when the
plaintiff has had adjudicated on a conciliation docket four cases
within the immediate preceding twelve months.'4 Policing a rule
of this nature could be handled by an affidavit of compliance similar
to the one now required of attorneys.' 5
The third limitation is one which would limit the type of suit.
12. II. Sup. Ct. R. 281, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 281 (1969).
13. Contra, supra note 6, at 423.
14. Common Pleas Court of Detroit R. 41. The Detroit small claims Court
was limited to claims of less than $100 until January 1, 1970, when that limit was
raised to $300. In 1968 the Detroit court had 373 cases. In 1969, the number
grew to 517. As of April 24, 1970, more than 200 cases had been filed in 1970.
Letter from Peter B. Spivak, Judge Common Pleas Court to James Fox, April 24,
1970.
15. The affidavit would have warnings which, similar to those used in other
small claims courts, alert the plaintiff to the fact that he may be waiving certain
rights by filing his case in the small claims court.
1971]
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This limitation may be necessary to prevent an ingenious plaintiff
from using a device such as an assignment for the purpose of evading
the limitation on the number of actions. For example, California,
New York City, and Detroit small claims courts have rules regarding
the type of claim. In addition, the California and New York rules
prohibit assigned claims, 6 whereas the Detroit rules prohibit filing,
where the plaintiff acquired the claim by assignment, transfer, in
trust or otherwise, from a previous owner.' 7 Only the Detroit rule
provides a limitation on the number of cases. At present, the Su-
preme Court Rules provide that, if the claim is based upon a written
instrument, a copy of it must be copied on, or attached to the com-
plaint.' If a rule of this nature were developed, this requirement
would alert the court to the wrongful docketing of a case in the sec-
tion. Also, this method could be supplemented by an affidavit of com-
pliance.
Thus, the New York and California restrictions 9 are similar.
While the New York court has been praised, numerous commen-
tators have noted that not only has the California court lost the at-
mosphere which is conducive to the unrepresented plaintiff, but it
has become almost the exclusive territory of the mass filing collection
plaintiff."'
The fourth limitation is one which would restrict the type of plain-
tiff. The Detroit court rule provides for the exclusion of both cor-
porate and partnership plaintiffs unless the person who personally
presents the claim to the clerk is a bona-fide member of the partner-
ship. 21 The New York court rule provides that no corporation, part-
nership or association shall institute such an action.2 It appears to
the writer that this restriction, while apparently preventing an abuse,
may have been based upon a false impression gleaned from statistics,
which show that the mass filing plaintiffs are of the corporate or
16. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 117f (West 1954); N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act,
§ 1809 (McKinney 1963).
17. Common Pleas Court of Detroir R. 41.
18. Ili. Sup. Ct. R. 282, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 282 (1969).
19. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 117f (West 1954); N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, § 1809
(McKinney 1963).
20. Note, supra note 4.
21. Common Pleas Court of Detroit R. 41.
22. N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act, § 1809 (McKinney 1963).
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partnership variety and should therefore be restricted. This exclu-
sion of plaintiffs is of questionable validity, except where the ex-
cluded plaintiff has another section to turn to for redress. However,
it may be an unnecessary or at least a cumulative restriction if the
second and third restrictions have already been enacted. It may be
argued that the allowance of fictional persons such as corporations in
the courts as plaintiffs would stifle the "atmosphere," but this ar-
gument is tenuous at best, considering the fact they may be sued
there as defendants. It may be argued that this policy will be helpful,
but the Illinois legislature should await further developments before a
restriction such as this would be enacted.
LIMITATIONS UPON REPRESENTATION
The fifth limitation is one which invariably has caused the most
debate in discussions prior to the creation of a small claims court.
The problem is: What limitation or prohibition of attorney partici-
pation in the small claims court is necessary in order to provide the
requisite atmosphere for the process to operate as envisioned? It
has been suggested by many thoughtful commentators that the dis-
couragement 23 or prohibition of attorneys in this section is essential. 24
The absolute bar of attorneys has been enacted in several jurisdic-
tions, notably California. 25  Besides an absolute bar, other means of
discouraging the participation of attorneys in the small claims sec-
tion have been utilized.26 New York, which does not have a prohibi-
tion upon attorneys in the small claims section, does have provisions
as to the time court is held and other such procedures to discour-
age attorney participation. The question of prohibition of attorneys
must then be first viewed from the perspective of the plaintiff. It is
obvious that the plaintiff has had first choice as to the type of court.
Prohibition of plaintiff attorneys is not a problem, since it was
the plaintiff who chose this forum. This restriction does not appear
to be unconstitutional where the section is not the exclusive means of
23. Institute of Judicial Administration Studies 1 (1959); Institute of Judicial
Administration Studies Part 2, 16, 28 (1955).
24. Supra note 2.
25. Lee v. Small Claims Court, 46 Cal. App. 2d 530, 116 P.2d 170 (1941).
26. McLaughlin v. Municipal Court of Roxbury Dist., 308 Mass. 397, 32 N.E.2d
266 (1941) (not prohibited but participation by judicial discretion); Doanne v.
Stein, 87 Or. 97, 169 P. 781 (1918).
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being heard,27 as the plaintiff can be said to have waived representa-
tion by his selection of forum. The question of the prohibition
against a plaintiff's attorney is most important in the situation where
the defendant seeks to raise the question of counsel. The possibili-
ties are: (1) the defendant seeks to remove the case from the section
by demanding representation; (2) the court recognizes the demand
and allows the defendant to have representation within the section;
and (3) notwithstanding the defendant's demand, the court prohibits
his representative to an appearance in court.
The fact that jurisdiction is forced on the defendant may create
constitutional problems where there is an arbitrary prohibition against
defendant representation. The United States Supreme Court stated
that "if in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a re-
fusal would be a denial of hearing, and therefore due process in
the constitutional sense."2 s California courts in attempting to avoid
any constitutional defect have interpreted their statutes as allowing
the defendant to be represented by counsel when he takes an "appeal"
to the superior court."2 The court held that due process is not denied
"as long as the right to appear by counsel is guaranteed in a real
sense somewhere in the proceeding."" ° The California approach of
allowing appeals as a method of relieving a possible constitutional
defect may not only be unrealistic,81 but is also inoperative in Illinois
where review of a lower court by a court of similar jurisdiction is
prohibited.82
The California approach is inappropriate in Illinois, unless every
defendant submitted to jurisdiction and waived the appearance of
counsel. If the defendant is allowed to force the case out of the
section by a demand for counsel, a greater frustration of purposes will
27. Prudential Ins. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d
38 (1946).
28. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
29. Supra note 27. This procedure is actually a trial de novo.
30. Id.
31. "Is a right of counsel for 91% of defendants who lose in small claims courts
guaranteed in a real sense when it can be empirically demonstrated that fewer than
1% appeal." Supra note 7, at 1676.
32. Judicial Article 8. See also Fins, supra note 8; Mulliken, supra note 8.
[Vol. XX: 912918
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occur than if the defendant could retain counsel and dispose of
the matter within the section, for if the case remains within the
section the unrepresented plaintiff will still benefit from the compo-
sition of the court as to its staff, procedures, and informality. The pro-
vision could be couched in such terms as to provide that, where
the defendant demands representation, the plaintiff would have the
choice of removing the matter to another section by retaining
counsel or remaining in the section unrepresented.
The previously mentioned restrictions are substantive in nature
and go to the question of the court's jurisdiction. Before looking
at the remaining substantive questions, such as the right to jury trial,
the right to appeal, and the right to a finding on both liability and
damage, the restrictions of venue which can be considered both sub-
stantive and procedural should be examined.
The present supreme court rule does not refer to venue, but only
provides that process out of county is not permitted when certified
mail is used for service. 8. The rule therefore allows, but does not
require, this form of service. This allowance raises the possibility of
personal service outside the county based upon the venue statement
that a claim can be filed where the transaction arose. 4 A possible
abuse of the court has occurred in the small claims courts which are
used for collections. The practice has been to file suit at the site of
the transaction, or at a site which was arranged at the time of the
transaction, such as the home office of the potential plaintiff.8 5 In
the area of the unrepresented plaintiff there is no reason to discrimi-
nate against him without a similar restriction in the collection section;
such a discrimination based upon representation is constitutionally
questionable.
Any limitation of this nature must be as to both sections. The
limitation cannot be by supreme court rule, as the authorization of
power to the court does not go as far as venue.8" The ability of the
court to govern service of process and, thereby, limit the action to the
33. Il1. Sup. Ct. R. 284, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 284 (1969).
34. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 5 (1967).
35. See Comment, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 876
(1964).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1967).
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county of filing by this power, appears to be inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the act relating to venue17 and is, therefore, unauthorized."8
Any attempt by the Court to limit process to certified mail, rather
than reserving that process as an alternative procedure, is not only
defective, but unwise, as many who use certified mail know that the
sophisticated defendant will not accept the mail and the sheriff, thus,
will be necessary for service of process. Any such limitation should
be by amendment to the Civil Practice Act itself.
JURY TRIAL
The next substantive problem is that of the jury trial.39 The argu-
ments regarding the restrictions on jury trials are basically those
raised in the attempts to place limitations upon representation. The
answer is not as easy as the answer to the question of representation
which was to allow the appearance of an attorney for defendant,
which gives the plaintiff a choice of either retaining counsel and
thereby removing the case to the other section or remaining unrepre-
sented and facing a skilled adversary in the small claims section.
The real question is whether it is at all possible for the unrepresented
plaintiff to present a case to a jury, especially where the defendant is
represented. Unless jury trials can be eliminated,40 the same ra-
tionale for allowing the case to remain in the section when the de-
fendant demands an attorney must prevail.
APPEALS
Any rationale that appeals should be prohibited41 or permitted for
the losing defendant only42 must meet and answer the same argu-
ments which have attempted to prohibit or restrict the right to repre-
sentation and the right to a jury trial. The argument is that the plain-
tiff has elected his court and, thus, has waived his right to appeal.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 5, 6, 7 (1967).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2 (1967).
39. Il1. Sup. Ct. R. 285, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 285 (1969).
40. Cf. O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases?, 58 ILL. B. J. 796 (1970).
41. McLaughlin v. Municipal Court of Roxbury Dist., 308 Mass. 397, 32 N.E.2d
266 (1941).
42. Superior Wheeler Cake Corp. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. 384, 264 P. 488
(1928).
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However, as seen supra, a limitation on the defendant's right to ap-
peal where the defendant is forced into a court which would prohibit
appeals is inconsistent with the described concept of ordered liberty
and is, hence, a clear violation of due process. In Illinois, appeals
must be allowed and must be taken in the same fashion as other ap-
peals. Any attempted prohibition on defendant's right to appeal
would only be possible where an effective waiver of appeal had been
made by the defendant. It is doubted that such a waiver would be
made.43
LIABILITY AND DAMAGES
The theory of the small claim assumes informality, but demands
an application of the substantive law.41 If Illinois is to provide a true
court for the unrepresented, it is not at liberty to dispense with a find-
ing as to both liability and damages.4 5  Suggestions regarding al-
ternative techniques and procedures have been used as supplements to
the court structure. Often these devices are measures to coax settle-
ment or arbitration in order to eliminate the need for court findings.
As small claims practitioners know, the judge all too often sends the
unrepresented defendant into the hall to work something out with the
collection attorney. It is doubtful that the court will be as trusting
with unrepresented plaintiffs; therefore, a formal structure for arbi-
tration should be built into the unrepresented small claims section. 6
However, the fact is that most alternative techniques which do not
have the standing of law or the persuasive power of the court are
often as ineffective as a letter from an attorney, or the Legal Aid
Bureau. It is only where the parties are willing to abide by the al-
ternative that such a possibility is viable. It may be noted that in the
New York system a provision within the small claims court has been
made whereby the case can be heard before an arbitrator, rather than
43. The New York small claims court has a provision where the litigants can
have their dispute heard before an arbitrator. However, one observer of that court
has stated that litigants often prefer to go before a judge and not waive their right
to appeal by going before the arbitrator. Letter from Karen Davidson, Assistant
Counsel, Department of Consumer Affairs, New York to James Fox, May 15, 1970.
44. Supra note 2. Interstate Bankers Corp. v. Kennedy, 33 A.2d 165 (D.C.
Cir. 1943).
45. Croft v. Lampkin, 112 Ill. App. 2d 321, 251 N.E.2d 88 (1969).
46. Consumers' Advisory Council, New York City, How to Sue Someone In
New York City Small Claims Court.
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before a judge. This alternative technique has a very persuasive fea-
ture which may be described to the unrepresented plaintiff in the fol-
lowing manner: "You can have the judge hear your case, if you are
willing to wait until about nine o'clock in the evening. If you do not
want to wait until then, you can have a lawyer, called an arbitrator,
hear your case."'47 Therefore, where the alternative is built into the
court's existing machinery, it appears to offer the hoped-for relief
for burdens which otherwise would be placed upon the court.
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
The foregoing description relates to the substantive aspects of the
court; and while it is beyond the scope of this paper to touch upon
all the possible procedural problems presented, a few are deserving
of mention here.
The simple complaint and pleadings essential to the court have
been provided for,4 as well as the dispensation of an answer4" by the
defendant. Assistance in filing and pleading has been considered es-
sential for this court. In Illinois, the statute which prohibits clerks
from preparing such pleadings presents a problem. 50 However, the
statute providing for duties of the clerk requires the clerk to do and
perform all duties as may be required by the rules and orders of the
courts.5' The prohibition statute excepts from its operation those sit-
uations in which the clerk may be required by law, or given authoriza-
tion by statute, to prepare the necessary pleadings and papers. It is
then to be argued that the reading of the two statutes together would
allow such assistance, if the duty to do so was required by order of
court.
Service of process must be kept inexpensive, but effective. To
what extent different papers can be served by certified mail has been
presented by other writers, 52 but there seems to be no sound argu-
ment for the prohibition of its use for summons, wage deductions, and
47. Id. at 15.
48. Il1. Sup. Ct. R. 282, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 282 (1969).
49. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 286, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, § 286 (1969).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 328 (1969).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 25, § 13 (1969).
52. Fins, Service of Process by Mail, 50 Cm. BAR. REC. 198 (1969).
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gamishments.58  Lastly, no judgment should be entered when based
upon the pleadings alone. A "prove up," or "inquest," as it is
referred to in New York, is essential-particularly where the plain-
tiff is unrepresented.
CONCLUSION
The substantive aspects of the unrepresented small claims plain-
tiff in court proceedings must be viewed in light of its purpose.
Thus, certain restrictions have been made. Where changes in these
restrictions are made, the rationale and balance of the system may re-
quire a restructuring of the entire proceeding. Although the pro-
cedural aspects are in no way complete, areas such as discovery, serv-
ice of other writs, and the question of counterclaims can be developed
only if the small claims court retains it's status as a court rather than
an extrajudicial body.
53. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 285, ILL. REV. STAT. chap. 110A, 285 (1969).
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